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Abstrak
Penelitian ini berangkat dari fakta bahwa, pondok pesantren selalunya dikaitkan dan bahkan diidentikan 
dengan berbagai bentuk pemikiran ekstrim dan tindakan radikal atas nama agama. Sehingga banyak 
kalangan ditengah-tengah masyarakat yang memiliki prasangka sosial terhadap keberadaan pondok pesantren. 
Sungguhpun demikian penelitian ini bertuujuan melihat hubungan antara prasangka sosial dan prilaku 
memberontak di kalangan santri Pondok Pesantren Modern Gontor Darussalam (PMDG) di Jawa Timur. 
Tiga teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah : (1) Teori prasangka soosial. (2) Teori pemberontakan 
(khususnya dalam konteks remaja) mengingat para santri umumnya tergolong dalam kategori remaja. Populasi 
penelitian ini sebanyak 2067 orang santri. Sungguh demikian sampel dalam penelitian ini sebanyak 335 
orang. Adapun formula yang digunakan untuk mengukur besaran ukuran sampel adalah : n = N/1+e2. 
Penarikan sampel dilakukan menggunakan simple stratified random sampling. Adapun teknik pengumpulan 
data dilakukan dengan skala psikologi dan kuesioner serta studi dokumentasi. Semenatara teknik analisa data 
dengan menggunakan pearson correlation (product momment) untuk melihat hubungan antara variabel. 
Hasil penelitian ini mendapati tidak adanya hubungan yang signifikan antara prasangka sosial dan prilaku 
memberontak dikalnagan para santri di ponpes PMDG. Hal ini dibuktikan melalui perolehan nilai r hitung 
= 0.328. dan t tabel = 1,64 serta p (value) = 0.90 > 0.05. 
Kata Kunci: Prasangka Sosial, Prilaku Memberontak, Pondok Pesantren Moderen Darussalam Gontor dan Santri. 
INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-
majority nation in the world, and is also home 
to significant religious minorities of Christians, 
Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, and others. 
Indonesia has a long history of cultural pluralism 
with the co-existence of many different religions 
(...Since Indonesia’s independence, there 
has been an increased in observance and less 
culturally-influenced and universal form of 
Islam. This country is not an Islamic state even 
though it is predominantly Muslims. Today, 
the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia 
are the “traditionalists” (Nahdlatul Ulama) and 
“modernists” (Muhammadiyah). In the post-
colonial Indonesia, several presidential regimes 
– most notably President Sukarno (1945-1967) 
and President Suharto (1967-1998) – created 
public policies that favored some religious groups. 
President Sukarno established the Pancasila 
or Five Principles as the foundation of its new 
constitution, “Belief in the One and Only God; 
just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; 
deliberation for consensus; and social justice for 
all of Indonesia’s people.” Later, under President 
Suharto, the government officially recognized 
five religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Hinduism and Buddhism. (https://ifeldp.
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wordpress.com acsessed April 1st , 2015), sects, 
and cultural groups. Currently, the government 
guarantees religious freedom to six officially 
recognized religions, however there is frequent 
conflict and controversy between the government 
and religious communities.
In addition, there has been recent violent 
conflict between Muslims and Christians in 
certain areas of Indonesia. In recognition of these 
tensions, several interfaith organizations and 
centers have been created to promote respect, 
dialogue, and cooperation among religious groups. 
Today, Indonesia is the site of the world’s largest 
democratic Islamic movement and provides a 
striking example of Islamic history and politics in 
a modern and pluralistic society (According to a 
report of the Indonesian Central Statistic Bureau 
in 2000, respondents identified as 88.2% Muslim, 
5.9% Protestant, 3.1% Catholic, 1.8% Hindu, 0.8 
% Buddhist, and 0.2% "other." "Other" includes 
traditional indigenous religions, other Christian 
groups, and Judaism. The majority of Indonesian 
Muslims are Sunni; however there are significant 
populations of Shi'a Muslims (over one million) as 
well as some other sects, such as the Ahmadiyya sect 
and syncretist traditions. In some areas of Indonesia 
it is difficult to find accurate statistics on religious 
belief because people who do not identify as one 
of the six religions recognized by the government 
(Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Confucianism as of 2006) go 
undocumented. For a more detailed breakdown of 
religious demography, refer to the US International 
Religious Freedom Report (2006) .
Based on the fact I would like to do a reserach 
about “Correlation Between Social Prejudice 
and Rebeliance Behavior of Students” (Study at 
Darussalam Modern Islamic Boarding School in 
East Java. Because most of Islamic School was 
victimised produce of terrorist. I.e.; Abrar Haque, 
43, the volunteer administrator of Cleveland's 
Al-Ihsan School of Excellence, was arrested on 
money-laundering charges. To learn more about 
his business, federal agents seized school records. 
(Feb. 5, 2005) The Islamic Saudi Academy helped 
shaped the views of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, who 
presently sits in a Virginia jail accused of trying 
to assassinate the president of the United States. 
(March 1, 2005); ...Ali Asad Chandia, 28, was 
arrested on the accusation of aiding two terrorist 
groups, including the Pakistani group Lashkar-
e-Taiba. He is a third-grade teacher at Al-Huda 
School in College Park, Maryland, a K-8 school in 
the suburbs of Washington, D.C. that specializes 
in teaching the Arabic language and the Koran. 
Also of note: he served as the president of the 
Muslim Students Association at Montgomery 
College in 1998-1999 and was a member of the 
"Virginia jihad network." (Sep. 17, 2005) Aug. 
26, 2006 update: Chandia, convicted in June 
on three counts of providing material support to 
Lashkar-e-Taiba, was today sentenced to 15 years 
in prison. At the sentencing hearing, Chandia not 
only maintained his innocence but threatened to 
exact revenge against all those responsible for his 
conviction: "those who participated in making 
my children orphans ... should just remember 
that the day of judgment is on the way (http://
www.danielpipes.org Acessed March 10, 2015)”.
One of the most frequently heard terms in the 
counterterrorism/counter-radicalism conversation 
in Southeast Asia is pesantren, or Islamic boarding 
school.  More often than not, the pesantren is 
associated with terrorism and/or radical Islam.  
Yet, despite all of the negative attention, the 
pesantren is poorly understood outside the world 
of sociology, religion, or anthropology.  Quite the 
opposite of what is often portrayed in the media, 
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the pesantren, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing 
force within Indonesian society.  It is in their 
interest to do so.  Unfortunately, a discourse 
(especially among counterterrorism experts on 
the pesantren’s role in maintaining stability and 
checking extremism in Indonesia is sadly lacking 
A number of Indonesia observers will concede that 
the vast majority of pesantren are non-violent, yet 
there are few inquiries into the positive role of the 
pesantren in preventing the growth of radicalism).
Research Problems
Then, Pesantrens that called as Gontor 
Darussalam Modern Islamic Boarding School 
always assume that they have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo because they often 
benefit from it.  In return for support from national 
and local governments, pesantrens disseminate an 
ideology that emphasizes moderation, tolerance, 
and religious harmony – all themes that buttress 
stability in a diverse country like Indonesia.  
Individual pesantrens and the pesantren system as 
a whole are not without vulnerabilities, however.  
With any symbiotic relationship, externalities 
could upset the mutually beneficial equilibrium.  
Well-funded extremists (foreign or otherwise) 
could offer inducements to any given pesantren 
that would alter the latter’s ideological outlook. 
Specifically the research want to explore about 
: (1) The social prejudice in Modern Islamic 
Boarding School (Gontor Darussalam). (2) The 
Rebeliance behavior of students for responding of 
“social stigm” of their institution. (3) Finding out 
wheter any connection between sosial prejudice 
and rebeliance behavior of students at Gontor 
Darusaalam Islamic Boarding School. 
Theri?cal Background
Prejudice in any form, racial or social, is 
destructive and costly to society. Up until the ‘60s, 
society accepted racial prejudice, then the target 
of racial prejudice rebelled and society realized 
the destructive force of this attitude. Today, social 
prejudice is accepted by society and few realize its 
destructive force. It kills motivation and increases 
overhead cost in business. It forces students to 
drop out of school with a failure label that prevents 
them from discovering their natural talent. Self-
fulfilling prophecy does the rest. Social prejudice 
believes other people are less capable than us. If 
we are managers and we think other people are 
less capable, then we will establish a management 
policy that reflects that belief. Through employee 
turnover and self-fulfilling prophecy, our opinion 
will be proven right. Social prejudice is like any 
prejudice, "I am better than them, I come from 
a better neighborhood, I have a better education, 
and therefore I must make all the decisions." 
Prejudice in any form, racial or social, carries 
a heavy price, it lowers efficiency and increases 
overhead cost. Prejudice kills communications, 
innovation, motivation just to name a few 
attributes.
Social class is a prejudice barrier between 
white-collar and blue-collar employees. With 
leaders prejudice as a role model, other, lesser-
defined social prejudice barriers develop in 
the organization. Departments will limit 
communication with other departments; 
craftsmen will consider production workers of 
low intelligence to name two. At each level, people 
believe lower levels have low capabilities and this 
becomes the mindset of the organization. Self-
fulfilling prophecy proves everyone right. Inthis 
reserach I would like to explore about the rebel 
which held by adolescence, because in psychology 
we knew that It's the poster characteristic of the 
teenager years: adolescent rebellion. And it's 
one that causes many conflicts with parents.
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Two common types of rebellion are against 
socially fitting in (rebellion of non-conformity) 
and against adult authority (rebellion of non-
compliance.) In both types, rebellion attracts 
adult attention by offending it. The young person 
proudly asserts individuality from what parents 
like or independence of what parents want and in 
each case succeeds in provoking their disapproval. 
This is why rebellion, which is simply behavior 
that deliberately opposes the ruling norms or 
powers that be, has been given a good name by 
adolescents and a bad one by adults. The reason 
why parents usually dislike adolescent rebellion is 
not only that it creates more resistance to their job 
of providing structure, guidance, and supervision, 
but because rebellion can lead to serious kinds of 
harm. 
Rebel l ion can cause  young people 
to rebel against their own self-interests ; -- 
rejectingchildhood interests, activities, and 
relationships that often support self-esteem, It can 
cause them to engage in self-defeating and self-
destructive behavior - refusing to do school work 
or even physically hurting themselves, It can cause 
them to experiment with high-risk excitement - 
accepting dares that as a children they would have 
refused, It can cause them to reject safe rules and 
restraints - letting impulse overrule judgment to 
dangerous effect. And it can cause them to injure 
valued relationships - pushing against those they 
care about and pushing them away. So adolescent 
rebellion is not simply a matter of parental 
aggravation; it is also a matter of concern.
Although the young person thinks rebellion 
is an act of independence, it actually never is. It 
is really an act of dependency. Rebellion causes 
the young person to depend self-definition and 
personal conduct on doing the opposite of what 
other people want. That's why the antidote for 
rebellion is the true independence offered by 
creating and accepting a challenge - the young 
person deciding to do something hard with 
themselves for themselves in order to grow 
themselves. The teenager who finds a lot of 
challenges to engage with, and who has parents 
who support those challenges, doesn't need a lot 
of rebellion to transform or redefine him or herself 
in adolescence.
To what degree a young person needs to 
rebel varies widely. In his fascinating book, 
"Born to Rebel" Frank Sulloway (Frank 
Sulloway "SURVIVING YOUR CHILD'S 
ADOLESCENCE" (Wiley, 2013)) posits that 
later born children tend to rebel more than first 
born. Some of his reasoning is because they 
identify less with parents, do not want to be 
clones of the older child or children who went 
before, and give themselves more latitude to grow 
in nontraditional ways. So, parents may find 
later born children to be more rebellious. From 
what I have seen in counseling, rebellion tends to 
have different roles in a young person's growth 
depending in which stage of adolescence it is 
expressed. Stage by adolescent stage, then, here is 
how rebellion seems to function.
Then, in the term pesantren goes back to 
Indonesia’s Hindu-Buddhist roots.  “… pesantren 
was per-santri-en, ‘the place where the wise men 
were,’ santri being a version of shastri, the Sanskrit 
word for a man learned in the Hindu shastras, the 
scriptures.” (V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers: 
An Islamic Journey (New York: Vintage Books, 
1981, 323).  Today, the pesantren is in practice an 
umbrella term under which a wide array of related 
yet diverse institutions fall.  A useful construct 
would be, perhaps, to look at the pesantren as an 
institution whose primary function is education.  
Primarily, but not exclusively, located in rural 
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areas, pesantrens provide a place for study where 
pupils can receive religious instruction from a 
religious teacher (kyai).  In many cases, pesantrens 
are boarding schools.  The traditional pesantren 
is duty-bound to accept any student who wants 
to study there and can pay a nominal tuition fee 
(Ronald Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 65).
In modern Indonesia, pesantrens as 
educational institutions are divided into two 
types: modern and traditional (sometimes 
called salaf in Indonesian, ... The term salaf, in its 
Indonesian usage, should not be confused with 
the term salafism, which has become synonymous 
with Islamic fundamentalist globally. Stripped of 
its current political connotations, the Arabic word 
salaf means predecessors. Thusly, a salaf pesantren 
in Indonesia simply means a school that follows 
the teachings of those who came before).  It would 
be far too easy and incorrect to equate modern 
pesantrens with bastions of forward-looking, 
liberal Islamic thought and traditional pesantrens 
with reactionary places that are hotbeds of radical 
thinking.  Rather, the distinction is largely one 
that deals with the type of curriculum (Lukens-
Bull, A Peaceful Jihad, 47)  A modern pesantren 
will, essentially, follow a nationally accredited 
school curriculum, determined by the Ministry 
of Education and/or the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs.  In theory, a pesantren that follows a 
national curriculum receives funding from the 
national government.  At the completion of a 
course of study, students receive a certificate 
that is equivalent to that of a state-run school.  
Traditional pesantrens, on the other hand, 
focus more exclusively on religious subjects, but 
may teach general subjects too.  In traditional 
pesantrens, however, the pedagogy and content 
are not accredited or held to a national standard.  
As result, financial support from the government 
is more limited, though not inconsequential.  A 
single pesantren can contain both modern and 
traditional teaching styles and curricula.
A majority of pesantrens in Indonesia are 
traditional and are therefore independent of 
formal government control.  An example of one 
such pesantren is the Miftahul Huda pesantren 
in Tasikmalaya.  This pesentren is in fact the 
flagship pesantren of a network of hundreds of 
affiliated pesantrens throughout Indonesia.  As 
such, the Miftahul Huda organization remains 
independent from any formal control of the central 
government.  The choice to remain independent, 
however, does not necessarily indicate any hostility 
toward the central government or a desire to 
overthrow it.  in an interview, the head of the 
pesantren in Tasikmalaya, Maoshul Asep Affandy, 
explained that many pesantrens choose to remain 
outside the national formal education structure 
for a variety of reasons.  Among the pesantrens 
affiliated to Miftahul Huda, some have adopted 
the nationally recognized curriculum and others 
have not.  “The choice each pesantren in our 
network makes is based on what fits their local 
circumstances best,” explained Affandy.“For 
instance, the pesantren here in Tasikmalaya 
remains traditional.  This is because there are 
already government schools and madrassas with 
whom our pesantren has a close relationship.  In 
fact, many of our students also attend the local 
government schools too,” Affandy added.  “All 
the pesantrens in our network, regardless of 
whether they are modern or traditional, follow 
the same religious interpretation of the Quran,” 
Affandy said.  Citing another reason, Affandy said 
that the ideal of self-sufficiency is key for many 
pesantrens and for that reason they did not want 
to lose the autonomy to design their own curricula 
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(Asep A. Maoshul Affandy, interview by Hilary 
Dauer (April 20, 2012). Pesantren students and 
leaders are often expected to provide religious 
instruction and perform religious services for their 
communities (Lukens-Bull, A Peaceful Jihad, 59). 
In Hindu-Buddhist days in Java,” V.S. Naipul 
wrote, “a pesantren was a monastery, supported by 
the community in return for the spiritual guidance 
and the spiritual protection it provided.” (Naipaul, 
Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey, 323).
Research Finding and Discussion 
There were two kinds of research finding 
in this research : (1) Descriptive analysis of 
respondent and spreading of mean data of 
variables. (2) The quanitiative analysis and testing 
of the hypotesis. 
According to Table 1.1 we found that most 
of the respondents at the Darussalam Islamic 
Boarding School (Gontor) studied at the senior 
high school level. Then, most of the ages of 
respondents at the Darussalam Islamic Boarding 
school (Gontor) between 15 – 17 years old. This 
research found that most of the respondents were 
coming from medium class level of economic 
background. Beside that, the research also 
found that most of the parents employees were 
enterprenour or private sector. After that, most 
of family social-organizational background was 
Nahdlatul Ulama. Then, according to the mean 
and spreading of frequance and percentage 
of social prejudice and rebeliance behavior of 
students at Gontor Darussalam Islamic Boarding 
School has been shown below : 
 The Categories Frequency Percentage 
 Thee Education level   
1 Junior high scool 167 49.85 
2 Senior high school 268 50.15 
 Sum 335 100.00 
 Ages   
1 12 – 14 years old 89 26.57 
2 15 -17 years old 246 73.43 
 Sum  335 100.00 
 The economic background   
1 High class level of economic 
background  (family income > Rp 
10.000.000 / month) 
51 15.24 
2 Medium class level of economic 
background (family income  Rp 
5000.000 – Rp 10.000.000 / month)  
 
189 56.42 
3 Lower class level of economic 
background (family income  < Rp 
5000.000 / month) 
95 28.34 
 Sum 335 100.00 
 The parents employee   
1 Civil servent 92 27.46 
2 Teachers / Lecturer 86 25.67 
3 Enterprenour / private sector 127 37.91 
4 Public service 30 8.96 
 Sum 335 100.00 
 The family social-organization 
background  
  
1 Nahdlatul Ulama 164 48.97 
2 Muhammadiyah 106 30.64 
3 Persis 35 20,39 
 Sum  335 100 
Source s: The reserach reports 2014 
The Descriptive Analysis of Respendent
Table 1.1 : The Descriptive Analysis of Respondent
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Table 1.2 The mean spreading, frequency and percentage of 
Social Prejudice 
The Categories Frequency Percentages
High 187 55.82
Low 148 44,18
Sum 335 100.00
Sources : The research reports, 2014
According to the Table 1.2 above, most of 
mean spreading were locating at the high level. 
It means that the social prejudicing which from 
the society has been implemented in Darussalam 
Islamic Boarding School (Gontor). Most of the 
social prejudice in the community based on, what 
information that they got from electronic media, 
news paper, internet and any kinds of information 
resource. Some of information an iresponsible 
and missleading to the society. Especially about 
violance and rebelian behavior which hipotetically 
taught in Islamic Boarding School (Including 
Gontor Darussalam as an Islamic Boarding 
School). 
Table 1.3 The mean spreading, frequency and percentage of 
Rebelliance Behavior of Students
The Categories Frequency Percentages
High 56 16.72
Low 279 83.28
Sum 335 100.00
 Sources : The research reports, 2014
According to the Table 1.3 above, most of 
mean spreading were locating at the low level. It 
means that most of the studnets at the Darussalam 
Islamic Boarding School (Gontor) had not 
implemented rebeliance behavior; they never 
wanted to involved with any kinds of violence 
(bullying, crime activities, etc). Beside that, the 
Darussalam Islamic Boarding School (Gontor) 
never tolerate with many kinds of violence. So, 
they never thought about the violence activities. 
They always try to make confortable condition 
(peacefull thinking and behavior) to study and 
playing. Although some of the community has 
a bad opinion and perspective about the Islamic 
Boarding School, the students at the Islamic 
Boarding School (specially; Gontor Darussalam) 
the never want to condammt or critique and also 
doing rebeliance behavior as a revange. Because, 
in the Islamic Boarding School, the students 
never taught to be a selfis person, intolerance, 
iresponsible or doing destructive behavior. 
Table 1.4 The Hypotesis Analysis
Social 
Prejudice
Rebeliance Behavior of 
Students Islamic Boarding 
School
Social 
Prejudice 
Pearson 
Correlation
1 .328
Sig. 
(2-tailed)
.090
N 335 335
Rebeliance 
Behavior of 
Students 
Islamic 
Boarding 
School
Pearson 
Correlation
.328 1
Sig. 
(2-tailed)
.090
N 335 335
 ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
According to The table 1.4 above, we got 
information that r score = 0.328. Then the table score = 
1,64 and p = 0.90 > 0.05. It means Ho was recieve 
and rejected H1. So, there were no correlation 
between social prejudice and rebeliance behavior 
of students at Gontor Darussalam Islamic 
Boarding School. 
DISCUSSION 
Today Indonesia is the world's most populous 
Muslim-majority country, with approximately 88% 
of the population identified as Muslim. However, 
Indonesia is far from being homogeneous; it 
has a long and rich history of religious diversity. 
This diversity draws from Indonesia’s history of 
trade, immigration, European colonization, and 
Indonesia's recent post-colonial political history, 
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all of which contribute to an environment of 
dynamic interaction between different cultures 
and religions. Current government methods for 
collecting religious demographic information are 
based on the policy of six officially recognized 
religions, within which all citizens must identify. 
However, this policy often over-simplifies and 
obscures the complexity of religious identity and 
activity at work in Indonesia.
The indigenous religious traditions of the 
Indonesian islands form a backdrop for the 
adaptation and synthesis of other religions into 
Indonesian culture. These indigenous traditions 
share several elements including: a balance 
between light and dark forces, the immanence 
of life (animism), and rituals and ceremonies for 
life and death. Other religions which arrived in 
Indonesia, starting with Hinduism and continuing 
through Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, were 
transformed by a process known as Javanization. 
Through this process incoming religions interacted 
with pre-existing indigenous values, institutions, 
and rituals, and eventually developed new and 
hybrid forms.
Hinduism arrived in Indonesia as early as 
the second century CE through Indian traders on 
the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi. By the 
sixth century Buddhism had also taken root in 
Indonesia, and peacefully coexisted and blended 
with Hinduism and preexisting native traditions. 
The Hindu-Javanese culture was rich and vibrant 
and at one time spread across all of current 
Indonesia, culminating in the Majapahit Empire in 
the fourteenth century. The dominant belief systems 
of the Majapahit Empire were Hinduism, with either 
Siva or Visnu as the principle deities, and Mahayana 
Buddhism. In addition there was a diversity of 
Hindu-and Buddhist-derived sects, ascetic groups 
and yogic traditions, and ritual practices belonging 
to ancient indigenous faiths, which held various 
fertility, nature-centered, ancestor and death-related 
beliefs. The general populace also held firm to 
ancient beliefs in gods, spirits, and other protectors 
(Fic 88-89). Today the Majapahit Empire is upheld 
as a golden age of culture and prosperity and looked 
to as a source of inspiration for the modern Hindu 
revival movement.
Arab Muslim traders began commerce 
with Indonesia in fourth century CE; however, 
Indonesians did not begin converting to Islam 
until the eleventh century. By the thirteenth 
century Islam was established in North Sumatra. 
It then spread through Malaya, Brunei, Java 
and Malacca. Two main factors contributed to 
Islamic conversions in Java: 1) Islamic traders 
who married local women and set up Islamic 
commercial communities on the coast and 2) Sufi 
teachers who penetrated the heartland of Java and 
taught mystic doctrines which were easily added 
to the existing synthesis of Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions (Fic 149-150). By the fifteenth century 
the Majapahit Empire was in decline, and in 
1520 the last Hindu kingdom in Java fell to the 
Sultanate of Demak. The last major independent 
empire on Java, prior to Dutch colonization was 
the Sultanate of Mataram, which ruled from the 
late sixteenth century to the early eighteenth 
century.
Although the majority of the population 
eventually converted to Islam, Indonesians retained 
much of the previous blend of Hindu, Buddhist, 
and native religious traditions, with unique 
practices, rituals, and ceremonies. Anthropologist 
of religion Clifford Geertz popularized the terms 
abagan Islam and santri Islam, to refer to the 
syncretic, indigenous and more ritualistic forms 
of Islam found in Java, versus the more pious, 
orthodox, Arab-influenced form. Until recently, 
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the majority of Muslims in Indonesia would be 
categorized as abagan Muslims, with a minority 
of santri Muslims. Since Indonesia’s independence 
there has been a trend of Islamization, increase 
in observance and turn towards a less culturally-
influenced, more universal form of Islam. Today, 
the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia 
are the “traditionalists” (Nahdlatul Ulama) and 
“modernists" (Muhammadiyah), both promoting 
santri Islam.
Christianity arrived in Indonesia during the 
sixteenth century through two means: Catholic 
missionaries brought by the Portuguese, and 
Protestant missionaries brought by the Dutch. 
Initially Christianity mixed with native ethnic 
traditions, creating hybrid forms that still survive 
in more isolated and rural locations. Christians 
(Catholics and Protestants combined) currently 
make up around seven percent of the population. 
In the twentieth century there has been an 
increase in missionary efforts and growth of 
both Roman Catholicism and various Protestant 
denominations, particularly concentrated in 
Papua, Flores, and Sulawesi.
The period of Dutch colonization, from 
the seventeenth to the nineteenth century 
was also the period of the highest rates of 
Chinese immigration to Indonesia. Traditionally 
these Chinese communities have taken up 
business and professional employment, belonging 
predominantly to the middle class. Chinese 
in Indonesia have faced great discrimination, 
prejudice, and even violence, during different 
periods in history, for example, during the anti-
communist purge under Suharto in 1965. Today 
communities of Chinese descent in Indonesia 
maintain a variety of religious traditions, including 
Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, and 
Christianity.
The Dutch colonization of Indonesia, 
beginning in the seventeenth century, brought 
about changes in Indonesian pluralism as the 
Dutch imposed their own beliefs and policies 
towards religious and cultural authorities. This 
often resulted in an increase of Protestant 
missionary activity. At the same time, the Dutch 
supported pre-existing Islamic governance 
structures in order to provide for more stable 
trading partners. This in turn led to decreased 
support for the traditional Muslim aristocracy 
because the populace associated them with the 
Dutch, and to the rising authority of rural Islamic 
boarding schools and mystical leaders. These 
leaders later became the basis for independence 
movements, which in the twentieth century 
coalesced around either Muslim or popular 
nationalist parties. In post-colonial Indonesia, 
several presidential regimes, most notably those of 
Sukarno (1945-1967) and Suharto (1967-1998), 
created public policies that favored some religious 
groups and discriminated against others.
In 1945 President Sukarno established the 
doctrine of Pancasila as the foundation of the new 
constitution. Pancasila's first principle states that 
the state is based on "belief in the one and only 
God." The adoption of Pancasila occurred over the 
defeat of the so-called Jakarta Charter, a proposed 
amendment to the Indonesian declaration of 
independence that would make Indonesia a 
Muslim nation by stating "the obligation to 
practice shari`ah for its followers." Under Suharto, 
the government officially recognized five religions: 
Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and 
Buddhism. Pancasila, the influence of shari`ah 
in national policy, and the position of official 
national religions are still topics of debate in 
contemporary Indonesia. See section on Pancasila 
and Government Practice and Policy.
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An interesting phenomenon in the current 
Indonesian religious landscape is the Hindu revival 
movement, centered in Bali and Java. Unlike the 
rest of Indonesia, Bali retained the pre-Islamic 
Hindu-Javanese culture, and is still predominantly 
identified as Hindu. Hinduism was recognized as 
one of the officially designated religions in 1962, 
primarily in response to activism from Balinese 
Hindus. The largest Balinese Hindu organization, 
Parisada Hindu Dharma Bali, later changed its 
name to Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia, in 
order to redefine Hinduism as a national rather 
than solely Balinese religion.
Beginning in the 1970s, various ethnic groups 
on other islands began to identify as Hindu, often 
seeking protection for their indigenous ancestor 
religion under the official title of Hinduism. New 
Hindu communities developed in Java, centered 
on the restoration and rededication of ancient 
Hindu temples such as Pura Mandaragiri Sumeru 
Agung, located on the slope of Mt. Sumeru, Java's 
highest mountain. Often these communities were 
financially supported by donors from Bali, but 
later grew through mass conversions and become 
sites of pilgrimage. Now the Hindu revival 
also has a strong utopian flavor; the popularity 
of prophecies from ancient Hindu Javanese 
personages such as Sabdapalon and Jayabaya, 
predict a dark age, identified with the current 
political upheaval, corruption and violence, to be 
followed by a golden age of peace and prosperity. 
The case of the Hindu revival is one of the many 
ways in which Indonesia's pluralistic history 
interacts with the Indonesian people's current 
political, social, and spiritual goals.
Being the world's third largest democracy 
as well as a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia 
has become the site for studying the development 
of modern Islam and democracy. Robert Hefner 
writes, "Today Indonesia deserves every democrat's 
praise for having created the largest movement for 
a democratic Islam in the world" (Hefner, Politics 
of Multiculturalism, 45). Indonesia’s history of 
diversity makes a rich precedent and foundation 
for the development of civic democratic society. 
In addition, the case of Indonesia provides an 
alternative to studies of Islamic politics focused 
on the Middle East. Hefner states, “Marginalized 
in treatments of classical Islam, Indonesia must 
be central to any effort to come to terms with the 
diversity of modern Muslim politics” (Hefner, 
Civil Islam, 6). The situation of religion in 
Indonesia, and Islam in particular, is complex and 
undergoing constant change. There are current 
trends that point to an increase in more orthodox, 
conservative interpretations of Islam. This is 
evidenced by various local counties, in particular 
Aceh, enacting versions of shari`ah-influenced 
law, and the existence of extremist and militant 
organizations such as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah 
Islamiyah. Some groups argue for abandoning 
Pancasila and instituting a fully Islamic state.
On the other hand, the largest Muslim 
organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah 
(1912) and Nahdlatul ‘Ulama (NU) (1926), 
coming from the modernist and neo-traditionalist 
movements respectively, are committed to 
upholding Pancasila and not instituting a Muslim 
state and promoting a pluralistic democratic 
state. In addition, organizations such as the 
Liberal Islam Network (1999) are dedicated 
to advancing liberal Islam, which it defines as 
struggling for civil liberties such as freedom of 
expression, minority rights, women’s rights and 
freedom of religion. Finally, although there are 
several political parties that have been founded on 
religious grounds, elections routinely demonstrate 
the general population's support for Pancasila and 
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for continuing a history of tolerance and diversity 
for the many religions co-existing in Indonesia.
There is a nation-wide network of NGOs and 
think tanks that manufacture ideology and then 
work with pesantrens to disseminate it.  One such 
think tank is the Jakarta-based Indonesian Society 
for Pesantren and Community Development 
(P3M), which promotes the ideals of moderation 
and tolerance.  Florian Pohl has described 
P3M’s work as utilizing “the extensive network 
of Indonesia’s pesantrens, which are agents for 
and targets of community development… with 
a particular focus on pluralism and democracy 
(Florian Pohl, “Islamic Education and Civil 
Society: Reflections on the Pesantren Tradition 
in Contemporary Indonesia,” Comparative 
Eduction Review 50 (2006): 396.).”
Evidence of the desires of the pesantren 
system’s leaders to maintain stability can be found 
in the aforementioned ideological outlook.  Often 
in Indonesia, ideological paradigms that favor the 
status quo can be identified through certain code 
words or rhetorical totems such as pancasila (see 
above), tolerance, and pluralism.  It is tempting 
to think of tolerance or pluralism as altruistic 
concepts but they are also useful to the national 
leadership of a religiously diverse country because, 
if accepted by society, they promote stability.  If an 
ideology of religious harmony can be inculcated 
in the people, then internecine violence would be 
less likely.  To this extent, the government funding 
detailed above also aids a kyai’s ability to spread 
his (or, in some very rare cases, her) ideological 
beliefs.  And, if a member of NU, the ideological 
position of the kyai will be in line, by and large, 
with the type of stability the government wants.
Then, pesantrens do not produce violent 
extremists and even terrorists. But until now, some 
people think that we called as social prejudice, 
saying can anything be learned from these 
outliers to the pesantren system as a whole?  In 
particular, why were these pesantrens susceptible 
to an ideology that encouraged its graduates to 
seek an overthrow of the system?  One of two 
conclusions would seem logical: 1) the extremist 
ideology that somehow infiltrated these pesantrens 
was so mesmerizing that it overwhelmed the 
rational cost-benefit analysis of the students, 
teachers, and the institution; or 2) some external 
force sweetened the incentives for taking on an 
ideology that rejected the current status quo 
and caused an individual pesantren to be an 
enemy rather than partner of the state.  In either 
case, the existing system was unable to counter 
the allure presented by radicals in these limited 
cases.  Time will tell if these few outliers become 
a trend and to what degree the government will 
do something to prevent the isolated phenomena 
from metastasizing.
CONCLUSION
In general, the pesantren system as 
a whole, as well as a great many pesantrens 
individually, maintains a close relationship with 
government. The relationship with government 
exists regardless of whether a particular pesantren 
receives government funding in exchange for 
teaching the government curriculum.  (But, 
Darussalam Islamic Boarding School in East Java 
always try to build their own values . Then they try 
tobe a self-sufficient institution. They have thirty 
kinds of small and medium indutry. Their want to 
be independent institution, (Fahmi Reza, 2013). 
Then, an individual pesantren is part of a religious 
infrastructure that is in many ways designed 
to keep the status quo.  One manifestation of 
this infrastructure is the relationship between 
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pesantren leaders and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 
the world’s largest private voluntary organization, 
and the government.  Pesantren leaders form one 
of the core constituencies of NU (Hefner, Civil 
Islam, 34).
 It would not be a stretch to say that NU was 
born in the pesantren (Said Aqil Siradj, “Pesantren, 
NU, dan Politik,” in Nahdlatul Ulama: Dinamika 
Ideologi dan Politik Kenegaraan, ed. Khamami 
Zada and Ahmad Fawaid Sjadzili, (Jakarta: 
Kompas Penerbit Buku, 2010), 86). Today, NU 
can be thought of as a loosely knit association of 
pesantren leaders.  In that sense, NU in many 
ways functions as an advocacy group for the 
association of pesantren leaders it represents.  For 
instance, NU works closely with the government 
to develop job prospects for pesantren graduates 
(Hefner, Civil Islam, 86). Since at least the late 
1950s, NU has accepted the central government’s 
secular, multi-confessional state ideology, known 
as pancasila, in exchange for support for NU’s 
educational and social programs.  In 1959, NU 
relented on its insistence for the inclusion of 
Sharia Law in the constitution and began a period 
of cooperation and accommodation with the 
Sukarno regime (Robin Bush. Nahdlatul Ulama 
and the Struggle for Power within Islam and 
Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: The Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, 56.) this 
cooperation continues to today.  In many ways, 
the NU’s relationship with the government is 
based around resource allocation (Bush, Nahdlatul 
Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam 
and Politics in Indonesia, 57).   
The case of Indonesia provides a factual 
counter argument to the fear of what an Islam-
centric civil society would wreak if they were let 
loose in a democracy.  Far from giving radicals a 
free reign, democracy allows Islamic civil society 
organizations an opportunity to be part of the 
system and benefit from stable government.  An 
open society allows religious organizations to 
become champions of large groupings of people.  
These religious organizations can, as champions, 
assert the interests of the people they represent vis-
à-vis the state.  In Indonesia’s case, NU has in some 
ways developed into an association of pesantrens.  
Rich civil societies allow for religious institutions like 
pesantrens to have enough power to act independently 
of the government and negotiate the rules of the 
game as equal partners. Contrary to popular belief, 
pesantrens, like most civil society structures, act as 
indigenous barriers to radicalism (*).  
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